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This paper aims at analysing whether banking changes that occurred in Italy in the last fifteen years have 
mined the soundness of its financial system. We look for potential threats to financial stability as a result 
of the dynamic behaviour of Italian banks that progressively have been favouring consumer households at 
the expense of firms in the allocation of credit. The theme of financial instability is closely linked to the 
question of capital regulation, which is a centrepiece of government intervention because it affects banks’ 
soundness and risk taking incentives. After reviewing the literature on capital regulation, we first discuss 
the role of guarantees as a solution to banks’ potential instability in the case of credit default and, 
secondly, we estimate a bank interest rate model that explicitly includes collateral and personal 
guarantees as explanatory variables. We show that banks follow different lending policies according to 
the type of customer. In the case of firms banks seem to efficiently screen and monitor customers and 
guarantees (real and personal) are both used to reduce moral hazard problems. In the case of consumer 
households and sole proprietorships banks behave “lazily” by replacing screening and monitoring 
activities with personal guarantees; instead, collateral is used to separate good from bad customers (i.e., 
to mitigate adverse selection problems). These results, together with the large proportion of bad loans in 
case of unsecured loans, may indicate the existence of potential sources of financial instability because 
(a) personal guarantees are a small share of loans, especially in the case of consumer households, (b) a 
decline in the value of collateral held by banks in the event of a housing market weakening. 
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Over the past several decades costly banking crises have stirred up again interest in understanding 
how supervisory and regulatory structures affect the stability of banking systems.
1 Banking is one of the 
most regulated industries in the world due to its central role in financial intermediation. Therefore, given 
that financial institutions and markets are not perfect substitutes, the configuration of financial systems 
matters and changes to one of these institutions likely have important consequences on economies’ 
performances. Indeed, banks have always been the most important financial intermediaries in all 
economies for their role as providers of liquidity insurance, monitoring services and information.
2  
Regulation is just one type of interventions of the State in the economy and, as it is the case for 
other industries, banking regulation is justified by the existence of market failures. Precisely, this is the 
point of view held by those who belong to what is known as the “public interest” school. In banking, the 
public interest would be served if banks allocated resources in a socially efficient manner, facilitated 
payments, mobilized savings, allocated capital, monitored managers, and provided tools for the 
management and trading of a variety of risks.
3 In this paper we follow the “public interest” approach for 
two main reasons. The first reason is that the “public interest” view is the one that dominates international 
thinking on regulation; the second one is that capital regulation, which is Pillar 1 in Basel Capital 
Accords, is a centrepiece of government intervention because it can affect banks’ soundness and risk 
taking incentives. Moreover, regulation has often focused on bank capital for its role in the corporate 
governance and competitiveness of banks (Santos, 2001). 
Led by what is now widely known as the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), a widespread 
debate still focuses on the most efficient way to guarantee financial stability. Specifically, a major aim of 
Basel II has been to revise the rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord in such a way as to align banks’ 
regulatory capital more closely with their risks, taking account of the progress in the measurement and 
management of risk and of the opportunities which these rules provide for strengthened supervision.
4 
This paper aims at shedding light on the role that guarantees and collateral play within the capital 
requirements argument and, consequently on the interest rate Italian banks charge to three different types 
of customers: firms, sole proprietorships and consumer households. We will focus on the latter because 
other Authors observed that household credit growth is a particularly important predictor of banking 
                                                 
1 Recently, Goodhart (2006) pointed out that there is no generally accepted definition of financial stability. In this paper we 
interpret financial stability as the absence of banking crises that impairs credit intermediation or capital allocation. 
2 On this topic see Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
3 See Barth et al. (2006), chapter 2. 
4  Recently, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006) showed that a significant and positive relationship between bank soundness 
(measured with Moody’s financial strength ratings) and compliance with principles related to information provision. 
Specifically, countries which require banks to report regularly and accurately their financial data to regulators and market 
participants have sounder banks. crises in countries with high propensity to consume (Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2006). Our work is in 
the same line of research of Pozzolo (2004). However, while the latter is mainly focussed on the 
relationship between guarantees and the likelihood of obtaining loans, our paper studies the relationship 
between bank interest rates and guarantees by means of an econometric model and a panel data made up 
of about 120 banks for the period June 2003-June 2006. We try to infer about the presence in the Italian 
banking system of potential instability from our empirical results, namely the sign and the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients of bad loans and guarantees. Indeed, the economic literature 
already highlighted how empirical relationships between interest rates and guarantees may reflect banks’ 
screening and monitoring activity. 
Our results show that banks follow different lending policies according to the type of customer. In 
the case of firms banks seem to efficiently screen and monitor customers, higher interest rates are charged 
to riskier customers, and guarantees (real and personal) are both used to reduce moral hazard problems. 
Moreover, collateral seems to be very effective: the average value of loan defaults is the lowest when 
compared to loans with personal guarantees and without guarantees, for all types of customers. It is likely 
that the efficacy of collateral as a means of avoiding strategic default depends upon the positive trend 
registered in collateral prices. Eventually, a decline in house prices would change the situation by making 
strategic default more likely. 
In the case of consumer households and sole proprietorships banks behave “lazily” by replacing 
screening and monitoring activities with personal guarantees; instead, collateral is used to separate good 
from bad customers (i.e., to mitigate adverse selection problems). In this role it works very efficiently in 
the case of consumer households, given that their ratio of bad loans to loans is the lowest. However, as 
above, collateral pledged by consumer households and sole proprietorships is subjected to the same 
concern about the event of a bubble burst that causes house prices to fall. Personal guarantees are still 
used to avoid strategic default. However, the estimated coefficient is not always statistically significant. 
In other words, banks behave “lazily”, i.e., they simply replace screening and monitoring activities with 
personal guarantees. Therefore, interest rates do not reflect differences in customers’ riskiness. 
These results, together with the large proportion of bad loans in case of loans without guarantees, 
may indicate the existence of potential sources of financial instability within the Italian banking industry. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic literature on capital 
regulation, guarantees and financial stability, while Section 3 discusses how changes occurred in the 
Italian banking industry since the beginning of Nineties affected the supply and the distribution of credit. 
Section 4 describes data we used to estimate our empirical interest rate model and discusses econometric 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 2. Bank Capital Regulation and Bank Soundness: A Review  
Several contributions illustrate why capital regulation might be important especially when banks 
have access to safety net (deposit insurance) and the presence of small, generally uninformed investors 
hold most of the bank debt (Barth et al. 2006, Santos 2001). 
Synthetically, deposit insurance gives banks an incentive to increase risk. The increase in risk, 
together with the potential externalities resulting from bank failures, justify the existence of minimum 
prudential capital/asset ratios that, therefore, become important in determining the amount bank owners 
must have at risk. In the intentions of international supervisory authorities, capital regulations may help to 
align the incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors. However, more stringent capital 
standards could still lead banks to choose riskier portfolios. Indeed, this may be the case if bank owners 
realise they are incurring in losses larger enough to completely absorb their bank equity. In this case, bank 
owners will have an incentive to choose a very high risk portfolio returning expected high returns, 
without bearing any further downside loss. 
On the other hand, in the presence of information asymmetries, an increase in capital standards 
leads banks to keep into account the higher costs they will incur in case of bankruptcy and the higher cost 
of funding. If these costs are transferred to firms, they will be induced to choose safer investments which, 
in turn, reduce banks’ risk of insolvency (Santos 2001). 
Therefore, there are conflicting theoretical predictions on whether capital requirements curtail or 
promote bank performance and stability. Recently, Barth et al. (2006, pp. 218-221) provide empirical 
evidence on the relationship between bank capital regulation and banking crises. In banking crises 
regressions, and after controlling for other important variables, they find no support that more stringent 
capital requirements reduce the destabilizing effects of generous deposit insurance. Indeed, the estimated 
coefficient of the capital stringency variable is negatively associated with banking crises, but this 
relationship is not robust to changes in model specification.
5 Instead, they do find that capital regulation is 
negatively correlated with the level of nonperforming loans. 
The preceding discussion on capital requirements shows that, even on a single topic, the bank 
regulation argument is far from reaching clear-cut conclusions concerning the best way to guarantee 
financial stability. It is also the case that financial stability trades off with the role financial systems play 
in favouring economic growth.  
Recently, Guiso et al. (2006) showed that, in the case of Italy, restrictions to competition reduced 
the supply of credit, but also reduced the percentage of bad loans. By contrast, deregulation worked the 
other way around. Moreover, restrictions on competition had negative effects on aggregate growth. 
Both in response to the critiques of Basel I, that made use of risk weights taken from those rating 
agencies, and in recognition of the changing financial markets, Basel II capital/asset ratios may be 
determined by means of internal models. This approach, particularly its advanced configuration, allows 
                                                 
5 Barth et al. explain the result may be due to the harmonization of capital regulatory policies introduced by the Basel Capital 
Accords and the consequent reduction in cross-country variation in capital/asset ratios. banks to derive default probabilities and loss given default to measure the overall risk of the bank rather 
than its individual components, the same way the market would measure it.
6  
The economic rationales behind the role formally played by collateral and guarantees in the Basel 
II analytical set-up of the formula used to measure risk are several. In a context where, for instance, moral 
hazard is the main problem in financial relationships, the right to repossess collateral gives lenders an 
essential threat to ensure that borrowers have an incentive to use the money borrowed productively. When 
this occurs, the banking system is more stable and banking crises are less likely. 
Within the New Basel Capital Accord, a collateralised transaction is one in which: 
•  banks have a credit exposure or potential credit exposure; and 
•  that credit exposure or potential credit exposure is hedged in whole or in part by collateral posted 
by a counterparty or by a third party on behalf of the counterparty. 
Where banks take eligible financial collateral (e.g. cash or securities), they are allowed to reduce their 
credit exposure to a counterparty when calculating their capital requirements to take account of the risk 
mitigating effect of the collateral. 
Banks may opt for either the simple approach, which, similar to the 1988 Accord, substitutes the risk 
weighting of the collateral for the risk weighting of the counterparty for the collateralised portion of the 
exposure (generally subject to a 20% floor), or for the comprehensive approach, which allows fuller offset 
of collateral against exposures, by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed to the 
collateral. Partial collateralisation is recognised in both approaches. Banks must have clear and robust 
procedures for the timely liquidation of collateral to ensure that any legal conditions required for 
declaring the default of the counterparty and liquidating the collateral are observed, and that collateral can 
be liquidated promptly. 
Where guarantees are direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional, and supervisors are satisfied that 
banks fulfil certain minimum operational conditions relating to risk management processes, they may 
allow banks to take account of such credit protection in calculating capital requirements.
7 
However, financial stability might be negatively affected by the presence of  guarantees and 
collateral in loans.  Indeed, the role of collateral and guarantees in lending relationship has been widely 
discussed, and different conclusions have been reached. Theoretically, under perfect information, there is 
no need to ask for collateral since the bank can distinguish between different types of borrowers, and has 
perfect knowledge about the riskiness of their investment projects.  
Under asymmetric information, however, collateral and personal guarantees play a role in solving 
different problems that may arise (Ono and Uesugi, 2006).  
First of all, there are problems linked to the riskiness of the borrower. A hidden information-
adverse selection   problem arises in situations in which banks cannot discern the riskiness of the 
entrepreneur. Without collateral, the average loan rate would be higher than the rate optimal for safe 
                                                 
6 See Barth et al. (2006), p. 70. 
7 BIS (2006), pp. 31-35. borrowers, and only riskier borrowers would apply for banks loans. In these situations collateral acts as a 
screening device to distinguish the riskiness of the entrepreneur, and the lower risk borrower will choose 
the contract with collateral in order to take advantage of the lower interest rate (Bester, 1995 and 1998).
8  
A hidden action-moral hazard problem arises when the banks cannot observe the information 
taken by the borrower after the loan is originated. In these situations collateral is used as an incentive 
device, and reduces the debtor incentive to default strategically. As Boot et al. (1991) show, if there is 
substitutability between borrower quality and action, the riskier borrower pledges more collateral, while 
the good borrower gets an unsecured loan. 
Moreover, there are studies that analyze the association between the length of the bank-borrower 
relationship and collateral requirements in both adverse selection and moral hazard settings. Among 
others, Boot and Thakor (1994) analyze repeated moral hazard  in a competitive credit market. They find 
that a durable banking relationship benefits the borrowers, in the sense that borrowers pay a high interest 
rate and pledge collateral early in the relationship, but, after they encounter the first project success, they 
are awarded with a unsecured loan and a lower loan rate.  
In a principle agent setting, John et al. (2003) find that collateral decreases the riskiness of a given 
loan, and that collateralized debt has higher yield than general debt, after controlling for credit rationing.  
Secondly, collateral influences the screening and monitoring activities of the banks. Given the role 
of the banks as information providers, in the literature there are different outcomes about the impact of 
collateral on bank’s screening and monitoring activities. According to the lazy bank hypothesis (Manove, 
Padilla, and Pagano, 2001), the presence of a high level of collateral weakens the bank’s incentive to 
evaluate the profitability of a planned investment project. In this case collateral and screening are 
substitutes for a bank, but they are not equivalent from a social standpoint. Indeed, the Authors find that 
collateral limitations are efficient in competitive credit markets. Rajan and Winton (1995), on the other 
hand, argue that since the bank usually has a greater incentive to ask for collateral when the borrowers 
prospects are poor, a high level of collateralization might be considered as a sign that the borrower is in 
difficult. Therefore,  the monitoring activity should be higher in the presence of higher debt 
collateralization. Longhofer and Santos (2000) argue that collateral and monitoring are complements 
when the bank takes senior positions on its small business loans. 
Finally, collateral requirements might be affected by the credit market competition. Besanko and 
Thakor (1987) analyze the role of credit market structures in the presence of asymmetric information. The 
Authors find that in a competitive market, the role of collateral is useful, and that low risk borrowers 
choose a contract with a high level of collateral and a low loan rate, whereas high risk borrowers choose a 
contract with a low level of collateral and a high loan rate. In the monopolistic setting, instead, collateral 
plays no role unless it is sufficiently valuable to the bank to make the loan riskless. Inderst and Mueller 
                                                 
8 However, in the presence of debt renegotiation, renegotiation might undermine the role of collateral as a screening device in 
the sense that if collateralization becomes attractive also for high risk entrepreneurs, the low risk entrepreneurs can no longer 
distinguish themselves by posting collateral (Bester, 1994). 
 (2006) analyze a model with different types of lenders: local lenders, with a soft, non contractable 
information advantage, and transaction lenders. The Authors show that as long as the information 
advantage narrows, and the competitive pressure from transaction lenders increases, local lenders should 
reduce the loan rate and increase the collateral requirements to maintain their competitive advantage. 
Empirically, results about the impact of collateral and personal guarantees on the loan rate are not 
homogeneous either.  Indeed, if collateral is used as a signalling device to solve the adverse selection 
problem, there should be a negative correlation between collateral and risk premium. On the other hand, if 
collateral is used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard, and the ex- ante risk of the borrower is 
observed, the correlation should be positive. Berger and Udell (1990) find that collateral is most often 
associated with riskier borrowers, riskier loans, and riskier banks, supporting the idea that observably 
riskier borrowers are asked to pledge more collateral to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Ono and 
Uesugi (2006), who analyze the small business loan market in Japan, reach similar results. The Authors 
find that collateral is more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers. Pozzolo (2004) argues that, when 
testing the relationship between risk and collateralization, it is important to distinguish between inside 
collateral and outside collateral, and between real and personal guarantees. Inside collateral is physical 
assets owned by the borrower, and its function is to order creditors priority in case of default. Outside 
collateral is assets posted by external grantors, and it increases the potential loss of the borrower in case 
of bankrupts. Therefore, the relationship between risk and guarantees should be higher in case of outside 
collateral, given that inside collateral does not provide additional losses to the borrower in case of default. 
However, empirically, real guarantees are used without the distinction between inside and outside 
collateral. Personal guarantees are contractual obligations of a third party, and they act as external 
collateral. However, they do not give the lender a specific claim on particular assets, limiting the actions 
he could take in case of borrower’s bankruptcy. On the other hand, real guarantees are easier to dispose, 
but they might be both inside and outside. Consequently, only empirical analysis may help to distinguish 
which of the two types of guarantees affects more the loan interest rate. The Author finds that real 
guarantees are not statistically related to the borrower risk, and interprets this finding as potentially 
consistent with the hypothesis that inside collateral is used as a signalling device to solve the adverse 
selection problem. On the contrary, he finds that personal guarantees are more likely to be asked for when 
the borrower is ex-ante riskier. However, once the borrower’s riskiness is controlled for, both real and 
personal guarantees reduce the interest rate charged on loans.  Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006)  
find direct evidence of a negative association between collateral and the borrower’s risk, thus supporting 
the theoretical idea of collateral used as a signalling device in an adverse selection setting. 
Some Authors investigate the relationship of other variables on the probability of a loan to be 
secured. Berger and Udell (1995) and Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006) find that borrowers with 
longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. Particularly, 
Berger and Udell (1995) find that the older a firm is and the longer its banking relationship, the less often it will pledge collateral. The result is seen as consistent with the idea that requiring collateral early in a 
relationship may be useful in solving the moral hazard problem. Berger and Udell (1995) also find a 
positive relationship between the total assets of the borrowing firms, that is a measure of its size, and the 
probability to get a secured loan.  
Analyzing the impact of relationship on the loan rate, Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2005) argue that 
the overall granting process is a sequential process given by three stages: application, decision and rate 
setting stages. The Authors find that the lending relationship matters only in the first and second stages, 
i.e.: conditional on being approved, relationships are not important in determining the loan rate. On the 
same direction, Petersen and Rajan (1994) do not find statistical evidence that the strength of the lender-
borrower relationship is correlated with cheaper credit. The Authors also find that firms that borrow from 
multiple banks are charged a significantly higher rate, and they do not find statistical evidence in support 
of alternative explanations different from the idea that multiple sources weaken relationships.  
As for the influence of collateral on screening and monitoring activities of banks, empirical 
implications of the theoretical models discussed above are different. Indeed, according to the lazy bank 
hypothesis, a higher screening activity should be observed when the borrowers post low collateral. 
Further, the average debt default should be higher when the creditors rights are more strictly enforced 
given that fewer projects will be screened in this case. On the other side, Rajan and Winton (1995) model 
predicts that collateralized debt should be observed more often in firms that need monitoring, and that 
changes in collateral should be positively correlated with the onset of financial distress. Jimènez, Salas-
Fumàs and Saurina (2006) discuss how the use of collateral as a substitute to the screening activity of the 
bank depends on lenders characteristics. 
Finally, the theoretical models seen on the relationship between collateral and competition predict 
a positive correlation between bank competition and collateral requirements. In the same line of research 
is the empirical analysis of Jimènez, Salas-Fumàs and Saurina (2006), who find that the use of collateral 
is less likely in more concentrated markets. The effect of credit market competition on lending 
relationship is analyzed in Petersen and Rajan (1995). They find that firms in the most concentrated credit 
markets are the least credit rationed, and that banks in more concentrated markets charge a lower than 
competitive rate on young firms, and higher than competitive rate on older firms.    
In countries like Italy, whose economy is largely dominated by small companies, the provision of 
(real and personal) guarantees has always played a major role in facilitating the flow of credit to 
borrowers.  
Beginning in the Nineties, the supply of credit to the economy has been also facilitated in Italy by 
the financial liberalization. The reduction of the Italian saving rate, the expansion of bank branches, the elimination of administrative limits (for example lending ceiling) proved to be some of the major 
explanations for the growth of credit.
9  
Financial intermediaries are generally thought to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems that can make raising external funds difficult and expensive for firms. Efficient financial 
intermediaries thus should benefit firms that are most dependent on external funds to finance their 
growth. Conversely, crises in the financial sector should have a disproportionately negative impact on 
firms that rely heavily on external sources of finance. In the economic literature on this topic, it is thought 
that small firms are likely those to be more sensitive to the availability of external sources of finance. And 
small firms are widespread and account for a large share of the Italian economy. However, an “excessive” 
credit expansion can be beneficial for economic development in the long-run, but it may negatively affect 
macroeconomic stability and lead to poor credit allocation in the short-run. Indeed, there is international 
empirical evidence that credit expansions are often followed by banking crises (Buyukkarabacak and 
Valev, 2006; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). This evidence, 
however, considers the growth rate of total credit to the private sector (households and firms) as a 
predictor of crises, but not separately. Indeed, household credit growth and firm credit growth have 
positive and distinct effects on the likelihood of banking crises. Household credit growth is a particularly 
important predictor of banking crises in countries with high propensity to consume (Buyukkarabacak and 
Valev, 2006). 
The economic literature has pointed to three channels through which credit expansions lead to 
financial crises:
10 
•  by leading to a current account deficit if the demand for goods cannot be satisfied by domestic 
supply. Moreover, while household credit growth raises the demand for consumption goods, firm 
credit growth raises the demand for investment goods. Therefore, borrowing to finance 
consumption does not add to long-term productive capacity of an economy. The consumption 
boom that results from rapid credit growth can be particularly strong in countries with 
traditionally low savings rates.
11 In these economies, the relaxation of credit constraints raises 
household indebtedness without boosting significantly future income, thus increasing default 
risks. 
•  by inflating asset bubbles. During a boom, credit expands and asset prices increase, which in turn 
increase borrowers’ net worth and leads to new lending and even higher asset prices. During a 
burst, the borrowers are not able to repay their loans and defaults increase. Household and firm 
channels are likely to be different. A large portion of household credit is mortgage credit and its 
                                                 
9 In recent years, the growth rate of banking loans does not reflect the overall credit granted by banks to customers due to the 
development of securitization. Indeed, from an accounting point of view, securitization changes the counterparties of loans (i.e. 
from firms to financials intermediaries), but reduces partially the credit risk of banks, in particular when securitizations regards 
bad loans. 
10 The discussion follows Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2006). 
11 According to Kirsanova and Sefton (2006), Table 2, 1997 savings rates in UK, US and Italy are 7.7%, 7.8% and 11.5%, 
respectively. rapid growth might result in inflated residential real estate prices. Problems with consumer credit 
have been noted as well. Growth in firm credit might be associated with growth in commercial 
real estate and/or equity prices, both of which have been associated with crises. 
•  by leading to an inefficient use of resources. Here we refer to the difficulties faced by 
overburdened loan officers to price loans appropriately when the volume of new loans created is 
increasing rapidly. These problems could arise from both household and firm credit growth. The 
economic literature has focused mostly on firm credit because much of the household credit 
involves collateral real estate and, therefore, requires less precise judgments on the part of loan 
officers (unless there is a large drop in real estate prices). However, the increase in the unsecured 
household debt should also be a concern since higher levels of debt to income increase the 
probability of defaults. 
 
Rapid growth in bank credit to the private sector is commonly associated to firm lending. 
In this paper, we aim at analysing how the credit market changed in the last decade and the role 
played by collateral. Specifically, we analyze whether: 
•  collateral reduces the screening activity of banks and increases the risk of moral hazard.  This 
“lazy” screening activity may affect allocation of funds in favour of projects with lower returns 
but that provide more collateral;  
•  the conventional wisdom that secured loans are less risky (and, thus, they carry lower interest 
rates) is supported by empirical evidence. We will also look at differences in interest rates in the 
case of real or personal guarantees. 
Descriptive statistics use aggregated data drawn from statistical return and report information on 
loans assisted by real and personal warranties, as well as on unsecured loans, broken down by sector of 
counterparties and type of banks. Econometric exercises are mainly carried out using data at bank or 
customer level drawn from statistical return and central credit register for the period 1998-2005; the main 
variables employed cover the characteristics of customers (such as size of firms, relationship lending, 
branch of activity), the type of loans, interest rates applied and characteristics of lenders (for example size 
of banks, cooperative vs other banks).  
 
3. Financial Liberalization and Credit Expansion in Italy 
Since the beginning of the Nineties, European banking has been undergoing a massive 
restructuring that promised to create vast new financial market efficiencies and to transform how business 
is conducted. Notwithstanding, banking industries still show marked differences among the largest 
European financial markets (France, Germany, Italy and the U.K.). While the number of credit 
institutions decreased in all four countries, in 2005 the number of banks is still remarkably different. In 
U.K. only 400 banks are active, compared to the 792 banks in Italy, the 854 banks in France and the 2089 banks in Germany (see Table 1). These differences are only partially explained by the relative importance 
of markets vs. credit institutions as the preferred way to fund the economy. Indeed, the U.K. is 
traditionally classified as an economy oriented to financial markets, meaning that companies give more 
importance to financial sources  coming from markets than from credit institutions. Consequently, the low 
number of banks might be easily explained. However, the situation observed in the other three countries, 
which are considered bank oriented, clearly reflects differences in domestic bank industry organization 
and regulation. The picture becomes richer when we compare the number of bank branches per 1000 
capita (see Table 2). In the last twenty years, Italian banks more than doubled their physical presence in 
the economy, while in the other countries the number of branches either remained relatively constant or 
significantly decreased. Differences are remarkable not only dynamically, but also in absolute levels in 
2005: Italy has the highest number of bank branches per 1,000 capita (0.54). The average number of bank 
branches for the European Union countries is 0.39.
12 
Finally, differences are observed in the banking market concentration. As expected, given the high 
number of banks, Germany shows the lowest bank concentration with respect to the other three countries. 
It is followed by Italy, also characterized by banks relatively small-sized, by the U.K. and, lastly, by 
France. The picture on banking concentration based on the Herfindahl index (calculated on banks’ total 
assets) or on the share of the five largest credit institutions in total assets is the same (see Table 3). 
One result from the previous descriptive analysis is that the Italian banking industry undergone a 
deep transformation the most striking result of which has been the increase and the diffusion of bank 
branches. Even in the most recent period with the widespread adoption of the information technology 
(IT), and the consequent possibility to access banking services from distant, bank branches are increasing 
on average at 2% a year.
13 
We expect to find that the bank branch development had a positive impact on the credit market. 
Table 4 provides a first answer to our hypothesis, at least with reference to the consumer debt market. In 
the both periods, 1980-1995 and 2003-2005, Italy shows a small stock of debt (housing mortgages and 
personal consumer loans). It is unlikely that small debt-consumption ratios for Italy are due to permanent 
severe liquidity constraints. It is more likely that the comparatively high level of interest rate makes 
consumers borrow less than in other countries.
14 The increase in the debt-consumption ratios between the 
two periods has been common to all countries in Table 4, and particularly marked in the case of the 
Netherlands. Notwithstanding a clear improvement, especially in the housing mortgage loan market, the 
Italian debt-consumption ratio in 2003-2005 is still below the levels of the other European economies. 
Further, the personal consumer loans-consumption ratio is about one-third of that of Germany and France 
                                                 
12 On this topic see also Calcagnini and Hester (2002). 
13 See the on line Statistical Bulletin at www.bancaditalia.it. 
14 See de Bondt (1999), p.7. and also Cosci et al. (2005), pp.16-17. (see Table 4).
15 In other words, financial liberalization resulted in an expansion of the Italian credit 
market, but still individuals seem to be not able to borrow as conveniently as individuals in other coun-
tries. That may be changing given that the Italian high saving rate will decline, as a natural outcome from 
the age structure of the Italian population as predicted by the life-cycle model of saving.
16 Consumer 
households’ gross saving, as a percentage of gross national disposable income, that was 21.8% in the 
period 1981-1990, declined to 10.3% in the period 1996-2005.
17 Further, a recent survey shows that 
between 2005 and 2006 there has been an increase (3%) in the share of households whose consumption 
was larger than their income. This share was 25% in 2006, almost twice as large as its value in 2001 
(13%). Among this 25% of households, 18% financed their consumption by reducing their wealth and 7% 
by borrowing. Further, of the whole sample, 37% of households answered that their savings were nil.
18 
In summary, the Italian consumer loan market is still thin compared with that of other European 
economies, but it shows several elements that potentially may transform it in a much larger market. Least, 
but not last, the capital regulation within the Basel Capital Accords that will become effective next year. 
Indeed, banks may find it profitable to increasingly provide loans to consumers because of their higher 
interest rates
19 and risk weights applied to the retail market segment are lower (75%) than those applied to 
unrated small- and medium-sized firms (100%). A negative consequence of these changes may be banks’ 
portfolio with larger shares of lower quality loans, but with higher returns.
20 Based on our previous 
review of the economic literature, a larger share of banks’ portfolio in low quality consumer loans 
represents a threat to the banking industry and financial stability. 
Between 1999 and 2006 the portfolio loan of Italian banks changed significantly in favour of 
consumer households. Their share increased by almost 7 percentage points as a result of a growth rate of 
120.9% in the whole period. As for firms, the share in the bank loan portfolio decreased from around 67% 
in 1999 to 62% in 2006. The growth rate of loans to firms increased in the same period of almost 65%. 
Finally, the growth rate of loans to sole proprietorships increased by 47.5% and, consequently, their share 
of loan portfolio decreased to 7.5% in 2006 from 9.3% in 1999 (see Table 5). 
Table 6 shows a breakdown of loans and bad loans by type of customer (all customers, consumer 
households, sole proprietorships, firms) and type of guarantee (real, personal, no guarantees).
21 Data 
shown in Table 6 should be read across years than along time. Indeed, bad loans also decreased because 
                                                 
15  However, it is also the case that consumers tend to arbitrage between mortgages and personal consumer loans, often 
obtaining credit more cheaply in the market for mortgages in order to finance current consumption rather than the purchase of 
a house (see Jappelli and Pagano, 1989). 
16 See Calcagnini and Hester (2002), pp. 152-153.  
17 See Bank of Italy (2006), p. 75. 
18 See ACRI (2006). 
19 In December 2005, the interest rate for loans to companies was 3.56%, that for mortgage loans to households 3.96%, and the 
interest rate for consumer loans 9.08%. See Bank of Italy (2006), Appendix, pp.175-177. 
20 See Santos (2001), p.30. 
21 All customers refers to a larger set of bank customers than the sum of consumer households, sole proprietorships, and firms. of extraordinary securization operations and write-offs, especially in 2005.
22 However, several facts are 
worth noting.  
First, loans to consumer households are mainly made of mortgage loans: in 1999, almost 64% of 
loans are guaranteed by collateral and this share increased in the following years up to almost 73% in 
2005. The share of loans with personal guarantees was almost 10% in 1999, but it dropped to around half 
of it in 2005. Finally, the share of loans with no guarantees averaged around 24% between 1999 and 
2005, and it decreased over the years. 
Second, as for sole proprietorships, we also note an increase in the share of collateralized loans 
and a reduction in personal guaranteed loans, while loans with no guarantees remained relatively stable, 
but at a higher level than in the case of consumer households. 
Third, a dynamics similar to that of consumer households and sole proprietorships is observed also 
for firms. The main difference is represented by the share of loans with no guarantees which is almost 
twice as large as that of the first two categories of bank customers. 
As expected, the larger share of bad loans originates among loans with no guarantees. This share 
is the largest in the case of consumer households and smallest in the case of firms. Moreover it declined 
between 1999 and 2005 for all three types of customers. Therefore, guarantees (real and personal) play an 
important role in establishing a sounder banking system. 
In the case of bad loans with guarantees, we note that consumer households show a larger share of 
bad loans correspondent to collateralized loans (a fact that mirrors their demand of mortgages)  than loans 
with personal guarantees. The situation in the case of firms is the opposite (especially in the most recent 
years), while sole proprietorships are in an intermediate position (see Table 6). 
A clearer picture of the risk associated with the different customers and type of loans emerges 
from the analysis of the bad loans-loans ratio that traditionally is used as a measure of credit risk (see 
Table 7). Sole proprietorships emerge as the riskiest type of customer especially when loans are provided 
without guarantees. There has been an improvement between 1999 and 2005,
23 but in 2005 almost 16% of 
loans with no guarantees defaulted. In the same year, sole proprietorships showed a higher bad loans-
loans ratio than consumer households and firms. With the only exception of firms, the risk of default 
increases going from collateralized loans to loans with no guarantees. It is likely that the low default risk 
associated with collateralized loans depends on the type of investment undergone with the mortgage, i.e. 
the purchase of houses and apartments in a period of time characterized by increasing prices. 
Results for consumer households seem to confirm, even though only partially, conclusions 
reached by Cosci et al. (2005). Indeed, the Authors find that Italian households borrow to stabilize their 
consumption path during time, without giving rise to situations of over-indebtness. However, Cosci et al. 
(2005) conclude their paper by formulating a hypothesis according to which in the future a growing 
number of families would need to borrow to stabilize their welfare. This expected increase in the loan 
                                                 
22 See Bank of Italy (2006), pp.232 and 315-316. 
23 See footnote 22. demand will represent a potential threat to bank stability if not matched by a correspondent increase in 
guarantees. 
 
4. Data, Model Specification, and Results 
This paper uses aggregated and individual statistics drawn from the ESCB (European System of 
Central Banks) harmonized data, the Statistical Return, and the Central Credit Register. Data are semi-
annual and refer to the period June 2003 - June 2006. Information refer to three types of operators (firms, 
consumer households and sole proprietorships), consistent with the ESA95 definition.  
Bank Interest Rates. Time series on interest rates are drawn from harmonized MIR (Monetary 
Financial Institution Interest Rates) statistics, collected by the Eurosystem since January 2003, primarily 
as a support to monetary policy. However MIR statistics are also suitable for economic analysis at 
national level. This information is collected and compiled by the Eurosystem; it is based on a 
representative sample of banks, made up of about 120 Italian banks.
24 Interest rates on loans to firms is 
the weighted average of new businesses up to and over € 1 million; interest rates on loans to consumer 
households and sole proprietorships is the weighted average of new businesses granted for consumer 
credit, house purchases and other purposes. Overnight interest rates are the arithmetic mean of the 
weighted average rates daily traded on the Interbank Deposit Market. 
Warranties. Real guarantees (inside collateral) are mainly mortgages granted by borrowers to the 
bank; personal guarantees (outside collateral) are guarantees granted by third parties in favor of 
borrowers. Data are drawn from Statistical Return. 
Loans and Bad Loans. Data are drawn from Statistical Return.  
Average Loan Duration. This information is the average length (in years) of customer relationship for 
each bank in the sample; it is figured out for firms, using individual data and refers to a period of five 
years prior each reference date. Data are drawn from Central Credit Register. Given that the Central 
Credit Register records borrowers with loans larger than € 75,000, Average Loan Duration has only been 
calculated for firms. Indeed, a large share of loans to households are smaller than € 75,000 and, therefore, 
Average Loan Duration would be uninformative. 
Regional Dummy. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for banks with headquarter in Southern 
Italy and 0 otherwise. 
Bank Size. Binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for banks which are classified as “major” or 
“large”, according to Banca d'Italia’s classification by size (see Bank of Italy, 2006), and 0 otherwise. 
Market Concentration. Herfindhal index on new loans to firms and households. This variable is 
calculated for each time period of our sample. 
Average Loan Size. This variable is the ratio between loan and number of customers, i.e., the average 
loan size granted by each bank to customers. It is calculated by using individual data drawn from the 
                                                 
24 For further details, see Regulation ECB/2001/18, and Battipaglia and Bolognesi (2003). Central Credit Register. As in the case of  Average Loan Duration, this variable is calculated on for firms, 
because of the bias due to the threshold of € 75,000 in the case of households. 
Variable descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix 1. 
We estimate a panel data model that relates the interest rate spread (average loan rate-overnight 
rate), the banks charge to different types of borrowers to a set of variables that capture the costumer 
riskiness, the presence of guarantees, the duration of the lending relationship, the loan size, and the degree 
of market competition plus additional control dummy variables: 
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where the subscript i refers to banks, t to the time period, and  t i, ε  is a composite error term that contains 
unobserved factors ( i λ , fixed or random), plus a Normally distributed error ( )) , 0 ( ~  
2
, u t i N u σ . 
We estimate equation [1] for three different types of borrowers: firms, consumer households, and 
sole proprietorships. We run both fixed effects and random effects specifications, but only report results 
for the latter on the base of the Hausman Test.  
Table 8 shows two specifications of equation [1] for each customer type. 
As for firms, in column (1) we control for the business cycle by adding Time Dummies. We find 
that Bad Loans have a positive and significant impact on the interest rate spread, i.e., riskier customers are 
charged with higher interest rates. The coefficient on Collateral is positive and significant. As already 
noted above, inside collateral does not increase the potential loss suffered by the borrower, but it is 
mainly used to order creditors’ priority. Therefore, ex-ante, the expected sign of its coefficient is not 
clear. The fact that the coefficient on Collateral is positive means that collateral is mainly used to reduce 
the moral hazard problem, i.e., observably riskier borrowers are asked to pledge more collateral. Personal 
Guarantees have also a positive and significant coefficient. This result is in line with the prevailing 
literature according to which riskier borrowers are asked to pledge personal guarantees (outside collateral) 
to avoid strategic default. The estimated coefficient of the Regional Dummy is not statistically significant, 
meaning that interest rates charged by banks located in the Southern regions are not different from those 
charged by banks located in the rest of Italy. Indeed, it is possible that Southern banks provide loans also 
to firms located in other regions, and/or that other variables (bad loans and guarantees) already capture 
the differences in customers riskiness in different regional areas. The Average Loan Duration coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant. This variable is a proxy for the duration of the lending 
relationship; therefore, a decrease in the interest rate is expected with an increase in the duration of the 
lending relationship. This finding is common to other empirical studies (among others, Berger and Udell, 
1995; Jimènez, Salas and Saurina, 2006). As long as the duration increases, the lender’s information about the borrower increases, and the moral hazard problem due to information asymmetries becomes less 
important (Boot and Thakor, 1994). As for the Bank Size Dummy, the estimated negative coefficient 
means that larger banks charge lower interest rates. According to Manove and Padilla (1999), and 
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) banks with larger resources devoted to evaluate the economic risk of 
a loan should have a lower incentive to substitute the screening activity with collateral. On the same 
direction, Jimènez, Salas and Saurina (2006), argue that  larger banks should have a comparative 
advantage in terms of the borrower’s risk evaluation. Therefore, these banks should have fewer moral 
hazard problems, and charge lower interest rates. The Average Loan Size coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant. Boot et al. (1991) argue that a higher loan dimension reduce the collateral 
requirement. Moreover, larger loans are probably a proxy for larger firms that have stronger contractual 
power and, therefore, are expected to pay lower interest rates. 
Estimates in column (2) refer to equation [1] when Time Dummies are replaced by Market 
Concentration.
25 The coefficient of Market Concentration is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that higher loan rates are associated with a higher market concentration. Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) find that the impact of market concentration is different according to the age of the firm, negative 
for young firms, positive for older firms. We cannot disentangle this effect due to the lack of information 
on firms’ age. However, our result also finds theoretical support in the work of Inderst and Mueller 
(2006) who show that an increase in bank competition increases the demand for collateral and decreases 
loan rates. 
As for consumer households, we have two specifications, one with Time Dummies and one with 
the Market Concentration index (columns (3) and (4), respectively). Differently from firms’ estimates, 
the coefficient of Bad Loans is negative but not statistically significant, meaning that interest rate is not 
influenced by households riskiness as measured by the share of Bad Loans. The coefficient of Collateral 
is negative and statistically significant. In this case, therefore, collateral is used by safer borrowers to 
signal their consumer type and take advantage of lower loan rates, as expected in an adverse selection 
setting (Bester, 1995 and 1998). On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of Personal Guarantees is 
not statistically significant. This finding may be interpreted as  a signal of a possible lazy behaviour of 
banks that replace the screening activity (i.e.: different loan rates to different borrowers type) with 
personal guarantees. For consumer households, it turns out that banks located in the South of Italy charge 
higher loan rates than in the rest of Italy. Indeed, the coefficient of the Regional Dummy is positive and 
significant. Given that consumer households markets are local (local banks serve local households) the 
interpretation is twofold. On one side, Southern consumer households may be recognized riskier. On the 
other side, Southern credit markets may be less competitive than Central and Northern credit markets. 
Finally, Bank Size is not significant in determining the loan rate.  
                                                 
25 Time Dummies and Market Concentration are collinear because the latter is calculated for each market (firms, customer 
households and sole proprietorships) and each time-period. As for firms, the Market Concentration coefficient is still positive and significant, underlining that 
banks in more concentrated credit markets charge higher rates (Column (4)). Moreover, differently from 
the previous specification, the coefficient of Personal Guarantees is still positive but significant. As for 
firms, therefore, Personal Guarantees are asked to riskier borrowers to reduce strategic defaults, and 
some screening activity seem to be performed by banks. However, it is worth noting that loans secured by 
personal guarantees are a small share of the total amount of loans to consumer households (Table 6), 
creating a concern about a possible source of financial instability.  
Columns (5) and (6) show results for sole proprietorships, with Time Dummies and  Market 
Concentration, respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of Bad Loans signals that 
also in this case higher interest rates are associated with higher risks. As for consumer households, 
Collateral and Personal Guarantees are asked to mitigate two different kind of problems: adverse 
selection and moral hazard, respectively. Indeed, the estimated coefficients are of opposite signs (negative 
and positive, respectively), but these findings are robust only when we control for Market Concentration 
(see Column (6)). As explained above, this result may indicate the lazy bank behaviour is more relevant 
in the case of sole proprietorships than in the cases of firms and consumer households. Banks require 
secured loans, but not necessarily higher guarantees are associated with riskier customers and higher 
interest rates. Again, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the Regional Dummy, means 
that credit markets for sole proprietorships are local, as observed in the case of consumer households: 
Southern sole proprietorships are either riskier or they are operating in less competitive credit markets. 
Finally, for  more concentrated credit markets, the cost of loan, captured by the loan rate, is higher.  
It is worth noting that the distinction between firms, consumer households, and sole 
proprietorships is empirically important, given the findings are not unique. Our results are threefold: 
•  first, we find that Italian banks use efficient screening and monitoring procedures to select firms in 
view of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) that will be in force in 2007. Indeed, banks 
require more collateral and personal guarantees to riskier firms and charge them with higher 
interest rates. 
However, in the case of consumer households and sole proprietorships, banks seem to devote less 
resources to screen and monitor customers’ behaviour. Indeed,  
•  as expected in adverse selection situations, collateral is mainly used by consumer households and 
sole proprietorships to signal themselves as safer borrowers and take advantage of lower interest 
rates; 
•  there seems to be no robust relationship between interest rates and personal guarantees. Banks 
behave “lazily”, i.e., they simply replace screening and monitoring activities with personal 
guarantees. Therefore, interest rates do not reflect differences in customers’ riskiness. Moreover, only a small fraction of loans to consumer households and sole proprietorships are secured 
by personal guarantees. This result may be cause for concern about banks’ financial stability, given that 
consumer households and sole proprietorships are the borrowers with the highest default rates (Table 6). 
    
5. Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by an important question concerning the financial stability of the Italian 
banking industry. Changes in banks’ portfolio have been favouring consumer households; their loan share 
increased significantly since the late Nineties driven by the demand for mortgages and by a decline in 
their savings rate. Moreover, the economic literature pointed out that consumer household credit growth 
is a predictor of banking crises. Here we attempted a first answer to our question concerning the stability 
of the Italian banking industry by analysing bank interest rate policies with respect to firms, sole 
proprietorships and consumer households. We described banks’ interest rate decisions keeping into 
account customers’ riskiness and their provision of collateral and/or personal guarantees, and by 
controlling for the presence of other characteristics of banks and/or customers. Our aim was to understand 
whether banks allocate funds efficiently and assure the stability of the whole financial industry. Our 
results are mixed. Banks show to dispose of screening and monitoring procedures that allow them to 
efficiently price loans to firms, while in the case of households and sole proprietorships, they behave 
“lazily” and make use of personal guarantees to avoid strategic default. However, personal guarantees are 
only a small fraction of loans, and consumer households and sole proprietorships are the bank customers 
with the highest default rates. Therefore, to avoid future potential threats to financial stability, we hope 
that Italian banks will devote increasing resources to the screening and monitoring of consumer 
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Number of credit institutions 
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
FR n.  a.  2,105 2,027 1,469 1099 854 
GE 5,356  4,740 4,720 3,785 2742 2089 
IT 1,156  1,192 1,156 970 861 792 
UK  n. a.  n. a. n. a. 564 491 400 
Source: Ecb, MFI Statistical Report. 
 
 
Table - 2 
Number of branches per 1,000 capita 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
FR 0.45  0.47 0.45 0.44 0.43  0.47 
GE n.  a.  0.61 0.63 0.59 0.69  0.53 
IT 0.22  0.23 0.31 0.41 0.49  0.54 
UK n.  a.  0.38 0.35 0.33 0.24  0.23 
EU (12)   n. a.  0.52 0.51 0.49 0.59  0.39 
Source: ECB, MFI Statistical Report. 
 
 
Table - 3 
Herfindahl index for credit institutions’ total assets and share of the  
5 largest credit institutions in total assets 
 
  Herfindahl index for credit 
institutions’ total assets 
(index ranging from 0 to 1)
share of the 5 largest credit 
institutions in total assets 
(percent) 
 1997 2000 2005 1997 2000 2005 
FR 0.0449  0.0589  0.0758 40 47  54 
GE 0.0114  0.0151  0.0174 17 20  22 
IT 0.0306  0.0190  0.0230 31 23  27 
UK 0.0207  0.0292  0.0399 28 30  36 


















Table - 4 
Consumer debt market (as a percentage of consumption) 
 
 Germany  France  Italy  Belgium  Netherlands 
 1980-1995 
Housing mortgage 
loans  55.6  40.5 7.0 31.8  39.5 
Personal consumer 
loans  16.4  5.8 2.8 6.6 3.9 
Total consumer 
debt  72.0  46.3 9.8 38.4  43.4 
       
  2003-2005 
Housing mortgage 
loans  71.7 44.7 21.0 50.4  133.7 
Personal consumer 
loans  13.7 14.2  4.5  5.6  9.0 
Total consumer 
debt 
85.4 58.9 25.5 56.0  142.7 




Table - 5 
Loans Distribution and Growth Rates 
 
  Firms Sole Proprietorships Consumer Households
  Distribution (%) 
2006 (June)  62.1  7.5  30.4 
1999 (June)  66.9  9.3  23.7 
  Growth Rate (%) 
1999 (June)-2006 (June)  64.8  47.5  120.9 
Source: Calculations based on Bank of Italy data.  
Table - 6 









Collateral  1999  28.3 63.7 33.7 24.0 
Personal Guarantees    20.8 9.8 39.3  27.1 
Unsecured    50.9 26.4 27.0 48.8 
    100 100 100 100 
        
Collateral  2002  31.7 67.5 38.2 26.6 
Personal Guarantees    18.8 7.0 34.6  25.6 
Unsecured    49.4 25.6 27.2 47.8 
    100 100 100 100 
        
Collateral  2005  42.7 72.6 45.4 32.2 
Personal Guarantees    15.7 5.4 28.0  23.6 
Unsecured    41.6 22.0 26.6 44.2 
    100 100 100 100 
Bad Loans 
Collateral  1999  24.2 24.8 18.7 26.3 
Personal Guarantees    21.1 9.9 22.8  25.0 
Unsecured    54.7 65.3 58.5 48.7 
    100 100 100 100 
       
Collateral  2002  24.4 25.5 19.6 26.1 
Personal Guarantees    25.2 10.1 24.2 31.7 
Unsecured    50.4 64.4 56.2 42.3 
    100 100 100 100 
       
Collateral  2005  24.0 28.5 21.0 23.5 
Personal Guarantees    26.7 10.3 26.4 33.0 
Unsecured    49.3 61.2 52.6 43.5 
    100 100 100 100 


















 Table - 7 








Collateral  1999 6.6  3.3  11.1  9.6 
Personal Guarantees   7.8  8.6  11.6  8.1 
Unsecured   8.3  21.2 43.4  8.7 
        
Collateral  2002  3.7 2.1 6.8 5.1 
Personal Guarantees    6.4 8.1 9.3 6.4 
Unsecured   4.9  14.0 27.5  4.6 
        
Collateral  2005  2.1 1.4 3.7 3.4 
Personal Guarantees    6.2 6.6 7.6 6.4 
Unsecured   4.3  9.7  15.9  4.5 
Source: Calculations based on Bank of Italy data. 
 Table - 8 
Interest Rate Spread Model – Random Effects Estimates  




  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Bad Loans/ Loans 
2.34
*** 
   ( 0.73) 
2.38
*** 
   ( 0.76) 
-1.56
 
    (1.06) 
-1.40
 
    (1.04) 
2.10
*** 
    (0.72) 
2.82
*** 




   ( 0.25) 
0.61
** 
   ( 0.24) 
-0.51
* 
   ( 0.29) 
-0.64
** 
   ( 0.30) 
-0.41
 
   ( 0.26) 
-0.88
*** 





   ( 0.25) 
0.81
** 
    (0.39) 
1.39
 
    (0.87) 
1.61
* 
   ( 0.87) 
0.05
 
    (0.35) 
0.69
** 
   ( 0.34) 
Average Loan Duration 
-0.20
** 
    (0.08) 
-0.17
** 
    (0.07) 
    
Average Loan Size 
-0.13
** 
    (0.07) 
-0.13
** 
    (0.07) 




  ( 14.17) 
  45.16
*** 
    8.96 
  -28.61 





     (0.11) 
-0.10
 
     (0.11) 
0.81
*** 
    (0.19) 
0.79
*** 
    (0.19) 
0.32
** 
    (0.13) 
0.18
 
    (0.14) 
Bank Size Dummy 
(Large Banks =1) 
-0.19
* 
    (0.10) 
-0.18
* 
    (0.10) 
-0.01 
    (0.17) 
-0.01 
   ( 0.17) 
-0.05
 
    (0.14) 
-0.06
 
   ( 0.14) 
Constant  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Time Dummies  9    9    9   
Hausman Test (p-value)  0.83  0.25  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 
No.of Observations  704  704  663 663 541 541 
Banks  108 108  105  105  94  94 
















Spread (interest rate – overnight 
interest rate)  1.55385 0.49343  -0.05043 5.81174 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.04693 0.07107 0.00102 0.80954 
Collateral/  Loans  0.33885 0.15871 0.00021 1.00278 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.26367 0.11400 0.00021 1.01054 
Average  Loan  Duration  3.01209 0.55327 1.00000 4.00000 
Herfindhal  Index  0.03321 0.00115 0.03186 0.03531 
Loan  Size  (log)  14.20851 1.83523 6.51026  17.72952 
Average Loan Size (log)  6.439886    0.99403    4.043051    11.33795 
Consumer Households 
Spread (interest rate – overnight 
interest rate)  2.39922 0.86539 0.13627 6.80369 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.03990 0.05267 0.00000 0.42781 
Collateral/  Loans  0.68330 0.19187 0.00010 1.00325 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.07108 0.05652 0.00000 0.37049 
Herfindhal  Index  0.04187 0.00283 0.03874 0.04811 
Loan  Size  (log)  13.33072 1.80825 2.99573  17.16740 
Sole Proprietorships 
Spread (interest rate – overnight 
interest rate)  2.40445 0.53415 0.93664 4.77367 
Bad  Loans/  Loans  0.07697 0.07734 0.00000 0.53959 
Collateral/  Loans  0.40970 0.16942 0.00001 1.00026 
Personal  guarantees/  Loans  0.31058 0.13152 0.00012 0.73091 
Herfindhal  Index  0.03658 0.00054 0.03549 0.03730 
Loan  Size  (log)  12.35439 1.29635 6.87109  15.87353 
Source: Calculations based on Bank of Italy data. 
 